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A R T I C L E S
New England Classical Journal 46.1 (2019) 21-36
What’s in a Name? Semantic In/
stability in the Ancient World and 




If the ability to name is a mark of the divine, confusing names is surely human. 
From the image of the tower of Babel to the Dao that can’t be named1 to current 
arguments about the “true” definition of patriotism, semantic instability, when words 
shift meanings and mean different things to different people and even to the same 
person at different times,2 is part of the human condition. When semantic shift oc-
curs, our socio-political realities concurrently change. Effects range from a descent 
into anarchic disorder and meaninglessness to simple neutral change to evolution 
and even “progress”3 in regards to individual development and understanding of 
1  “The Way is hidden and without name.” (Daodejing of Laozi 41, tr. Ivanhoe). Cf. DJ 1, 32, 37.
2  As Hobbes noted, “The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please and displease us, 
because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the 
common discourses of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our 
conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently 
we can hardly avoyd different naming of them.” Lev. 4.17.
3  The post-enlightenment notion of ‘progress towards perfection’ in regards to naming has admittedly 
a social Darwinist flavor compared to random evolution, and thinkers voice very different notions of 
what constitutes ‘progress.’ For example, a Confucian seeks to restore the meanings of names to what 
they meant under the Zhou dynasty, a Platonist to make names match the Forms to which they refer 
as much as possible, and a Ciceronian promulgates a political vocabulary of an idealized republic that 
never really existed.
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others’ points of views. In the global classroom, diversity of language and meaning 
is prized as a tool for enhancing learning. We encourage students to voice vary-
ing definitions of words such as “justice” and “equality” 4 so that a breadth of views 
fosters both a depth of understanding and a respect for varying interpretations of 
these values.5 In stark contrast to this fostering of definitional plurality, pre-mod-
ern thinkers both in the Greco-Roman world and ancient China encouraged their 
students to practice semantic stability as a means of ensuring unity of thought and 
thereby harmonious political order. The thing to which a name refers, its nominatum, 
should be the same thing for everyone. Why does semantic instability cause, rather 
than diminish, social instability for these classical thinkers, and why did they think 
“out of one foolish word may start a thousand daggers,” as Bentham later warned?6
T H E  H I S T O R I C A L  C O N T E X T
In Greece of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, conversations about semantics7 were 
typically couched in the larger debate about the contest between nature, or physis, 
and nurture, or nomos, which were treated for the most part as antagonistic, rather 
than complementary, binaries. Ever since Plato’s Socrates was famously blamed for 
having divided the “mind” from the “tongue,” series of binaries have shaped the 
western philosophical and rhetorical tradition.8 Conventionalists, represented here 
4  For example, in our globalized Great Books curriculum at NYU, students learn the difference 
between arithmetic (one for one equity) and proportional justice (the more one puts into a system, 
the more one gets out of it) and grapple with the Ciceronian view that (arithmetic) equality is most 
unequal. Cf. Cic. Rep. 1.43, 53; Plato, Laws 757b, Rep. 558c; Arist. Pol. 1301b29ff.
5  For more on diversity in all forms as a key ingredient in modern education and the perspective 
that “there is no education without diverse points of view” and “Diversity is like Veritas: it’s an ideal of 
which we are in constant pursuit,” see Powell (5/31/18).
6  For Bentham’s attack on the French Declarations of Rights as semantically unstable, and therefore 
politically dangerous, “nonsense upon stilts,” see sections 1, 2, 4, 10, 16, and Conclusion of his “Anarchical 
Fallacies” later entitled “No French Nonsense: Or, A Cross Buttock for the first Declaration of Rights: 
together with a kick of the Arse for the Second…by a practitioner of the Old English Art of Self 
Defence.” Cf. Schofield (2002, pp. 317ff ).
7  For more on the fifth century interest in investigating the nature of language, see Connor (1984, p. 
99, n. 48).
8  For Cicero’s lament that Socrates divorced eloquence from wisdom, see esp. De Orat. 3.56-62, 72. 
The following binaries dominate ancient Western philological discussions on naming: Convention-
alism: Realism :: Nomos: Physis :: Non-Being: Being :: False: True :: Unstable: Stable :: Ignorance: 
Knowledge :: Body: Mind :: Experience: Reason :: Eloquence: Philosophy.
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by Hermogenes from Plato’s late dialogue Cratylus and by Hobbes,9 argue that 
names are the result of an artificial consensus and are customs created by man to 
avoid the anarchy that would result if everyone were to name everything as he or she 
pleased.10 True and false are aspects of speech, not of things,11 and the application of 
a name is no guarantee of a thing’s epistemological reality. For these moderate skep-
tics, the application of names allows us to have a working knowledge of the world, 
but this application will not confirm the “realness” of said world. We shall never be 
sure if our perceptions, or anyone else’s, are correct or not, and submission to an 
agreed upon name ensures the preservation of peace and security for all.12 From the 
conventionalist standpoint, incorrectly applied names create propositions that are 
not simply errors but logical absurdities.13
In contrast to conventionalists, realists posit that truth is an aspect of reality 
and that names should reflect that reality accurately if they are to be correct accord-
ing to nature. As Socrates argues, “…we cannot name things as we choose; rather, 
9  Though not ancient, I’ve added Hobbes since his words epitomize the materialist, Epicurean 
attitude towards naming as conventional, which neatly contrasts with the realist view posited by ethical 
idealists like Plato. He also shared the view of Thucydides, whom he translated, that man’s tongue could 
well be a “trumpet to war and sedition; and it is said that Pericles once made thunder and lightning in 
his speeches and threw all Greece into confusion.” (De Cive 5.5, tr. Tuck).
10  Arguing that new names given to domestic slaves by their masters are just as correct as their 
old names, Hermogenes asserts, “…no one is able to persuade me that the correctness of names is 
determined by anything besides convention and agreement…No name belongs to a particular thing 
by nature, but only because of the rules and usage of those who establish the usage and call it by that 
name.” (Plato, Crat. 384c-d, tr. Reeve).
11  “For True and False are attributes of speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is 
neither Truth nor Falsehood…” Hobbes, Lev. 4.15. Following Aristotelian logic, Hobbes posits that true 
and false are attributes of “affirmations,” (i.e. propositions): “… truth consisteth in the right ordering of 
names in our affirmations.” Thus, if a name is incorrectly applied to its nominatum, then it is the appli-
cation of the name that is false, but not the name itself.
12  The Hobbesian sovereign, for example, is first and foremost a name maker who takes man out 
of the state of nature, which for Hobbes is a state of war thanks to man’s ability to name things for 
himself. For more on the epistemological need of a sovereign, see Civ. 5, Lev. 13, 17-18. As Ball points 
out, “The sovereign supplies nothing less than the common coin of political currency, the conceptual 
currency that makes civil society possible... Word and sword are two sides of the coin of civility.” (1985, 
p. 759).
13  According to these thinkers, only humans (but not animals) have the “priviledge of Absurdity” 
thanks to their ability to speak, which is their ability to reason (Lev. 5.20). Hobbes, for whom reason is 
the reckoning of names, argued the Greeks thought not that “there was no Speech without Reason; but 
no Reasoning without Speech…But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon 
a general inference which is false; though it commonly be called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, 
or senslesse Speech…the possibility of it is unconceivable.” Lev. 4.16-5.19. Cf. Cicero, Div. 2.119. For the 
requirement that words denote conceivable things, see Murphy (2005, p. 141).
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we must name them in the natural way for them to be named and with the natu-
ral tool for naming them. In that way, we’ll accomplish something and succeed in 
naming, otherwise we won’t.”14 Both sides, however, admit that the distinctions be-
tween conventionalism and realism are not hard and fast. Hobbes, for example, tells 
citizens not to defer to commonly used definitions of absurd, albeit conventional, 
words like “transubstantiation,”15 and even the realist Socrates admits that, although 
in theory names ought to represent their nominata perfectly, in reality names are, 
like portraits, merely approximate representations, not exact replications, of their 
nominata. Just as a perfect replication of Cratylus would be a duplicate Cratylus,16 
a perfect name would be the thing itself it names so perfection of names is just not 
in the cards.17 Both convention and realism play a role in the naming process,18 and 
the etymologies that pervade Cratylus are Socrates’ method of decoding convention-
al, derivative names to find their earlier, uncorrupted meanings, which would have 
been more accurate, i.e. names that partook of the essence of their nominata, had 
the early name-makers known the Forms and not have been dizzy on Heraclitean 
flux theory.19 
14  Crat. 387d. Cf. Crat. 428d.
15  For more on how common men speak “insignificantly” and how the meanings of even weighty 
philosophical terms like “Entity” and “Essence” are in actuality “no Names of Things” but rather moving 
targets or “Signes, by which wee make known, that wee conceive the Consequence of one name or 
Attribute to another,” see Lev. 5.19-21, 8.39, 46.
16  Crat. 432b-c.
17  Socrates, recognizing that “an image cannot remain an image if it presents all the details of what 
it represents,” admits that correctness in regards to naming sensory qualities can never be exact as 
calculating numbers is, and thus “we must look for some other kind of correctness in images and in the 
names we’ve been discussing, and not insist that if a detail is added to an image or omitted from it, it’s 
no longer an image at all.” Crat. 432a-d. By revealing the impossibility of the realist project of naming 
and the importance of knowing the limits of language, the “Cratylus is thus an exercise in comporting 
oneself correctly toward language.” Ewegen (2014, p. 144).
18  As Socrates puts it, “…both convention and usage must contribute something to expressing what 
we mean when we speak…I myself prefer the view that names should be as much like things as possi-
ble, but I fear that defending this view is like hauling a ship up a sticky ramp, as Hermogenes suggested, 
and that we have to make use of this worthless thing, convention, in the correctness of names.” Crat. 
435b-c.
19  Socrates, positing that there is a “civil war among names” in regards to their claims to truth, admits 
that it is far better to understand things “through themselves than to do so through their names,” since 
the original name-givers, who, wrongly thinking that the things they named were, like everything else, 
“moving and flowing” and constantly “coming into being,” fell “into a kind of vortex and are whirled 
around in it dragging us with them….” The epistemological value of a name is thereby critically lim-
ited, “and surely no one with any understanding will commit himself or the cultivation of his soul to 
names, or trust them and their givers to the point of firmly stating that he knows something…” Crat. 
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This assumption that earlier applications of names would be more correct than 
later attempts, which Plato undercuts in the Cratylus, is characteristic of classical 
thinking globally. During the late 6th to 3rd centuries BCE, when philosophical and 
rhetorical discourse blossomed in China as it did in Greece and Rome,20 Legalistic 
thinkers, Mohist etymologists, and Confucian scholars posited in varying degrees 
that a rectification of names (zheng ming) would usher in a return to the Golden Age 
when Zhou li (rituals that actualized one’s potential ren, goodness) flourished and 
reflected the Way of Heaven.21 In the Analects, Confucius argues, like Socrates, for 
a realist conception of naming, i.e. that names should accord with reality/the Way 
as much as possible in order to foster social and civic harmony. Consider the grave 
socio-political ramifications of incorrect naming in the following vignette:
Zilu asked, “If the Duke of Wei were to employ you to serve in the 
government of his state, what would be your first priority?”
The Master answered, “It would, of course, be the rectification of names 
(zhengming).”
Zilu said, “Could you, Master, really be so far off the mark? Why worry 
about rectifying names?”
The Master replied, “How boorish you are, Zilu! When it comes to 
matters that he does not understand, the gentleman should remain silent. 
If names are not rectified, speech will not accord with reality; when speech 
does not accord with reality, things will not be successfully accomplished. 
When things are not successfully accomplished, ritual practices and music 
will fail to flourish; when ritual and music fail to flourish, punishments 
438d-440d. cf. Crat. 411b-c.
20  Scholars of classical Chinese rhetoric, positing that rhetorical traditions do exist even when they 
are not explicitly identified as such, argue that ming bian (the power of names) is, albeit different in aims 
and methods, comparable to the western rhetorical tradition. For this position and ways of approaching 
Chinese rhetoric on its own terms, see especially Lu and Frank (1993, pp. 445-463); Lu (1998, pp. 1-43, 
293-303); You (2006, pp. 425-448).
21  For more on the relationship between ren and li in Confucius, see Shun (2002, pp. 53-72). For Mo-
hist and Legalistic interpretations of zheng ming, see Lu (1998, pp. 203-222, 272-283). For the Neo-Mo-
hists, whose focus shifted from ethical concerns to the nature of language itself in their project of lei 
ming (categorizing names), see Zhiming (1990, pp. 210-215).
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and penalties will miss the mark. And when punishments and penalties 
miss the mark, the common people will be at a loss as to what to do with 
themselves. This is why the gentleman only applies names that can be 
properly spoken and assures that what he says can be properly put into 
action. The gentleman simply guards against arbitrariness in his speech. 
That is all there is to it.  (Confucius, Analects 13.3, tr. Slingerland)
Many of the assumptions made by Greco-Roman philosophers – for example, that 
the ordering of names affects moral character, is constitutive of socio-political struc-
tures, and is thus a prescriptive and not merely descriptive process – are shared by 
Confucius. Plato separates dialectic as a technê, or craft, aimed at truth and knowledge 
from rhetoric, a tribê, or knack, aimed at persuasion and belief.22 Likewise, Confucius 
distinguishes between the good speech of gentlemen (junzi), which reflects the Way, 
versus glib speech of base people (xiaoren) whose words exceed their actions.23 And 
like Plato and Aristotle, who posit that the misuse of words like “equality” leads to 
civic upheaval, for Confucius, misapplied names divert the human Way from the 
universal Way of which humans are just a part. Improper naming dooms civil society 
to confusion and social anarchy.24 One’s words (ming), which ought to correspond to 
one’s actions (shi),25 are really bearers of the human social order and, if mixed up, will 
lead that order astray from the heavenly one it should mirror.26 There are differences 
22  Because rhetoric is merely irrational flattery that can give no account of the real nature of the 
things it is discussing, it is a knack. Cf. Gorg. 463a-466a.
23  The gentleman, whom Confucius fashions as an ethical rather than martial ideal, guards against 
bombastic speech, while petty people take delight in their “predeliction for petty cleverness” via empty 
conversation. Cf. Analects 4.22, 4.24, 14.4, 14.27, 15.17, 15.23. For more on the inherent link between good 
speaking and good character in Confucius, see Lu (1998, pp. 157-165, 294-298).
24  Distinguishing between verbs like “taking” vs. “borrowing” (Social superiors can only take, but 
never borrow, from their social inferiors) and proper names such as “lord” vs. “minister,” Confucius 
admonishes his listeners to use names correctly to ensure political stability: “Certainly if the lord is not 
a true lord, the ministers not true ministers, the fathers not true fathers, and the sons not true sons, even 
if there is sufficient grain will I ever get to eat it?” Analects 12.11. Cf. An. 12.17, 13.14, Exoteric Commentary 
5.33.
25  Although such a “one-to-one” correspondence might seem logically impossible, considering that 
one has varied li to discharge in multiple social roles (e.g. as father/son/husband), for Confucius, as for 
Panaetius and Cicero, the self is social, “relational,” and defined by how it navigates the various relations 
in which it finds itself. Cf. Zhiming (1990, p. 207).
26  For more on how the “language-world relationship in the classical conception of language is 
analogous to the doctrine of the unity of Heaven and man,” and how man’s words are of a piece with 
the reality they describe and therefore need to be correct to ensure harmony, see Zhiming (1990, pp. 
195-219).
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between Confucianism and Platonism: the Confucian Way is more in flux than the 
forms, Confucian chiastic style treats opposites more as complements than binaries, 
and Confucius seeks restoration, while Plato aims at re-direction. Still, both posit 
that careful, non-arbitrary communication builds character and community, while 
empty, or arbitrary, eloquence destroys them. 
Faulty communication leading to a lack of community is a key theme in Thu-
cydides. His famous Corcyrean stasis description is the locus classicus of semantic 
instability:
So the condition of the cities was civil war, and where it came later, 
awareness of earlier events pushed to extremes the revolution in thinking…
And in self-justification men inverted the usual verbal evaluations of actions. 
Irrational recklessness was now considered courageous commitment, 
hesitation while looking to the future was high-styled cowardice, 
moderation was a cover for a lack of manhood, and circumspection meant 
inaction, while senseless anger now helped to define a true man, and 
deliberation for security was a specious excuse for dereliction…those who 
managed to accomplish something hateful by using honorable arguments 
were more highly regarded…In this way every form of viciousness was 
established in the Hellenic world on account of the civil wars, and the 
simplicity (to euêthes) that is especially found in noble (to gennaion) natures 
disappeared because it became ridiculous…The weaker in intellect were 
more often the survivors; out of fear of their own deficiency and their 
enemies’ craft, lest they be defeated in debate and become the first victims 
of plots as a result of the others’ resourceful (ek tou polytropou) intellects, 
they went straight into action…With public life confused to the critical 
point, human nature, always ready to act unjustly even in violation of the 
laws, overthrew the laws themselves and gladly showed itself powerless 
over passion but stronger than justice…           Thuc. 3.82-4; tr. Lattimore
Although there is debate among commentators whether Corcyrean revolutionaries 
deliberately changed the meanings of names as in Orwell’s 1984, or whether they 
merely exploited the valences of existing names, or, if lacking the concepts of “the 
good” and “the noble” in their degenerated state, they were obliged to apply the vo-
cabulary of goodness to bad things and vice versa,27 the passage nevertheless shares 
27  For a discussion of these varying viewpoints, see Wilson (1982, pp. 18-20). Employing both hyper-
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the Confucian belief that the disintegration of language is both the effect and the 
cause of political stasis.28 Whether it be Greek “courage” and “moderation” or French 
liberté, egalité, and fraternité, as Dickens later lamented, names, slogans, and the 
values behind them in a violent world are readily radicalized to the point of reversal 
of meaning, or even meaninglessness. Excess (pleonexia), a natural tendency within 
human nature and language, breeds further excess which eventually leads to the si-
lencing of voice and self. Indeed, Thucydides presents Athens’ own self-destruction 
as a result of her ever-growing inability to communicate effectively with the Greek 
community (e.g. her Persian-like verbal assault on the Melians) and with herself 
(the disastrous Sicilian expedition).29 Athens’ self-annihilation can be blamed on her 
hubris, but, as Thucydides intimates, it may also be due to the inevitable corruption 
that is inherent in the very  words by which Athens herself is made. Just as ancient 
scientists thought that the seeds of destruction were inherent in things (e.g. rust was 
inherent in iron),30 so they thought that language was both constitutive and destruc-
tive, hence the need for a rectification of terms. If only the Greeks could restore, 
rather than laugh at to euêthes, “ancient simplicity,” a stable, traditional value, and if 
only they could reject, rather than admire, the novel and clever sophistry that revels 
in shifting words and values, they could resist corruption and save their social order. 
Thucydides nicely terms the new ethos that was in fashion in Corcyra to polytropon, 
“being of many faces,” the adjectival form of which Homer had applied to Odysseus, 
another role shifter and name changer.
Names, however, have many valences that are easily exploited and tend towards 
entropy. “Freedom,” for example, can be confused with “dominion” since it means 
both “freedom from” and “freedom to.” As Hobbes argued, the Greeks and Romans 
overly stressed the “freedom to” valence of the term, and in doing so transformed the 
meaning of “freedom” to “dominion.” The Western parts, as he puts it, paid dearly 
for learning Greek and Latin since their “specious name of Libertie” threw them 
bole and euphemistic understatement, the revolutionaries tampered with the existing ordering of names 
and thereby insinuated new “affirmations” which, as Hobbes posited, determine what is considered to be 
truth (Lev. 4.15).
28  As in Hobbes, since language itself is a fluid substance that paradoxically destabilizes meaning 
even in the act of creating it, it likewise undermines the political structures that are constituted by it. Cf. 
Skinner (2011, pp. 569-577).
29  For more on Athens’ inability to live up to her own standards of civilized speech and on her polit-
ical instability as a result of being a polis built upon speech, which is inherently inconstant, see White 
(1984, pp. 59-92).
30  The theory of bugonia similarly rests on this assumption. cf. Verg. Georg. 4.281-314, 554-558.
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into a state of nature, another Corcyra, where since everyone has freedom to every-
thing, including naming, no one has freedom to anything.31 For Hobbes, for whom 
“subjects” and “citizens” denote the same thing, and the vaunted term “tyrannicide” 
really means “regicide,”32 true freedom is removing oneself from the state of na-
ture and submitting to a sovereign who regularizes names. Of such rectification 
Herbert Hoover would have approved, who himself became victim to a semantic 
reversal of the very same word. Before FDR, the valence of the word “liberal” that 
was emphasized was the “freedom from” part, and “liberalism” meant what today is 
called “conservatism,” i.e. freedom from big government. After FDR, however, who 
emphasized the “freedom to” valence, “liberal” became associated with liberality, the 
New Deal, and big government. Hoover, none too pleased about this semantic shift, 
gave up the word “liberal” altogether and famously said, “They have nested in this 
word until it stinks. Let them have the word. It no longer makes sense.”33
Is a rectification of terms the best way to deal with the political threat that se-
mantic instability poses? Does semantic instability even pose such a threat? Indeed, 
there are two points of view that contrast with the ones we have met so far. First, is 
the Daoist position here represented by Lao Tzu, Khongzi’s teacher in legend who 
liked to shock his student with dirtiness and other deliberate breaches of ritual con-
duct as a way to teach Khongzi, whose Jesuit name, Confucius, means “to bathe,” to 
be natural. For the Daoists, Confucianists were degenerate Daoists who, in an effort 
to accommodate and rationalize human reality, had in their reliance on rites slipped 
away from the universal Way (Dao), an indivisible unity of which humans are a 
31  “And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a 
habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of 
their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I 
think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought 
the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues.” Lev. 21.111.
32  Since that which our atoms are attracted to we call “good,” whereas that by which our atoms are 
repulsed we call “evil,” for Hobbes a tyrant is simply a monarch that somebody does not like; the only 
correct term for denoting an illegitimate leader is a hostis (public enemy); hosticide, but not tyrannicide, 
is licit. cf. De Civ. 7.3, 12.3. According to Hobbesian semantics, freedom under a monarchy is no differ-
ent from that under a democracy, and the Aristotelian division of good vs. bad regimes based on rulers’ 
aims is mistaken: “The ancient writers on Politics have introduced three other kinds of commonwealths 
in opposition to these: in opposition to Democracy is Anarchy, or confusion; to Aristocracy, Oligarchy, i.e. 
government by a few; to Monarchy, Tyranny. But these are not three further kinds of commonwealth, 
but three alternative names, which have been bestowed by people who were annoyed with a government 
or its members.” De Civ. 7.2. cf. De Civ. 10.8, Lev. 21, 29, 46.
33  Public Statements, 1945, Hoover Papers.
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part.34 The Confucian attempts to manifest the Way of humans (ren dao) through 
rituals (li), working from the outside in, while the Daoist focuses on manifesting 
the Way of heaven (tian dao) through spontaneous (wu wei) action, working from 
the inside out.35 In contrast to Confucius’ rectification of names (zheng ming), which 
Daoists saw as actually widening the gulf between humans and the Dao, Daoists 
emphasize namelessness (wu ming) to avoid distorting the Way:36
A Way that can be followed is not a constant Way/A name that can be 
named is not a constant name/Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven 
and Earth… These two come forth in unity but diverge in name/Their 
unity is known as an enigma.     DJ 137
In ancient times, the best and most accomplished scholars were…Honest, 
like unhewn wood.      DJ 15
The Way is forever nameless/ Unhewn wood is insignificant yet no one in 
the world can master it…When unhewn wood is carved up, then there are 
names/ Now that there are names, know enough to stop!  DJ 32 
In short, Daoists reject the name game altogether since names, which inherently 
classify and divide things into binaries, can never capture the essence of a reality 
that is a unity.38 All the binaries that characterize the western texts in this talk such 
34  As Lao Tzu puts it, “Those who are ritually correct act, but if others do not respond, they roll up 
their sleeves and resort to force/And so, When the Way was lost there was Virtue/When Virtue was 
lost there was benevolence/When benevolence was lost there was righteousness/When righteousness 
was lost there were the rites/The rites are the wearing thin of loyalty and trust, and the beginning of 
chaos.” DJ 38.
35  For a comparison of Confucius’ emphasis on ritual as a means of self-cultivation and realizing ren 
with Lao Tzu’s reliance on natural action as manifesting the dao through de (virtue), see Coombs (2005, 
pp. 17-21, 30-31); Li (1998, pp. 225-233). For Lao Tzu’s advice to depend on one’s “belly,” or instinct, rather 
than on one’s mind, or reason, see DJ 3, 12.
36  For more on Daoist wu ming as a corrective to Confucian zheng ming, see Li (1998, pp. 233-238).
37  Daodejing of Laozi, tr. Ivanhoe.
38  The text repeatedly admonishes that those who know the Way do not talk about it, whereas those 
who talk about it do not know it. For more on the need for practice in lieu of words, see DJ 2, 23, 41, 43, 
56, 81. Both Confucians and Daoists posit that in a perfect state of being, there is no need for words: 
“Would that I did not have to speak! ...What does Heaven ever say? Yet the four seasons are put in 
motion by it, and the myriad creatures receive their life from it. What does Heaven ever say?” Analects 
17.19. cf. An. 2.1, 12.3, 13.27, 15.5.
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as Being vs. Non-Being, Nomos vs. Physis, and Reason vs. Passion dissolve in the 
yin yang symbol, which treats seeming opposites as interdependent complements: 
one (e.g. light) cannot exist without the other (dark). To manifest the Dao naturally, 
one need be like nameless, unhewn wood.39 If one carves up reality into words, like 
turning wood into a bookcase, let’s say, or a doorframe, then one has created unnat-
ural divisions and has limited and thereby distorted meaning. The “closed fists”40 of 
Platonic dialectic, Confucian rectification, and Hobbesian standardization, all aim 
to remedy rhetorical instability by closing off meaning. In contrast, Daoists, like 
many postmodern theorists, favor the “open hand,” which allows for a free play of 
signs but only so long as the process is natural and spontaneous (wu-wei). Daoist se-
miotics are thus not open ended, as these shifting signs reflect the eternal flux of the 
Dao’s state of being and constant becoming. 41 Lao Tzu’s text manifests this flux, and 
the rhetorical figures of speech and thought known for changing words’ meanings 
that are favored by sophists like Gorgias and that so worry Western thinkers – for 
example, paradoxes,42 oxymorons, and metaphors, which Hobbes calls “fools’ fires,”43 
– pervade Lao Tzu’s poetical text, which itself demonstrates the paradox that art is 
a lie that tells the truth. This text’s reversal of norms inspires students to struggle 
to understand its meaning,44 and of all the ancient theories on semantic instability, 
39  For unhewn wood as metaphor for the pure natural state, see DJ 15, 19, 28, 32, 37, 42, 57. For the 
yin yang symbol, the unity of which is mirrored by the chiastic structures of the text’s admonitions, see 
especially DJ 42.
40  For more on Zeno’s well-known comparison of dialectic to a “clenched fist” and rhetoric to an 
“open hand” (SVF 1.75), see Atherton (1988, pp. 399ff ) who argues this too sharp distinction dissolves in 
Stoic oratory’s “origins as open-handed dialectic” that reveals “the limits of reason.”
41  For a comparison of Daoist and poststructuralist semiotics, which share epistemic, but not onto-
logical, skepticism, see Combs (2005, pp. 143-149).
42  The text is replete with paradoxes such as excessive learning is ignorance (“the farther one goes, 
the less one knows”), too much strength is weakness, and the more one strives for a goal, the further 
away it becomes (Yoda’s “Do. Or do not. There is no try.”): “Those who stand on tiptoe cannot stand 
firm/Those who stride cannot go far/Those who make a display of themselves are not illustrious/Those 
who affirm their own views are not well-known/Those who brag about themselves are not accorded 
merit/Those who boast about themselves are not heard of for long.” DJ 24 cf. DJ 2, 5, 7, 11, 22, 29, 40, 
43-5, 47-8, 56, 57, 76, 81. These paradoxes demonstrate how human nature reflects the interaction of the 
cosmic elements (earth, metal, water, wood, and fire), of which it is made. Seemingly weak water, for 
example, quenches powerful fire. Cf. DJ 8, 78.
43  Employing metaphors and similes to underscore the point, Hobbes argues that “metaphors, and 
senseless and ambiguous words are like ignes fatui” (Lev. 5.22); words are “wise mens counters” if “they 
do but reckon by them” themselves, but they are the “mony of fooles” for those who rely on pseudo-au-
thorities like a Cicero or Aquinas to define meanings for them. Cf. Lev. 4.15.
44  For the argument that this struggle, which sets students off-kilter, is actually the intent of Lao 
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students respond most to Lao Tzu’s and deeply engage with his enigmatic words,45 
which brings us finally to the student point of view.
All the ancient texts here, including the Daoists, share this thread in common: 
They consider language normative, constitutive for better or worse, and prescriptive, 
not descriptive, in nature. The fact that names constitute, rather than just present, 
our reality, may be a good thing or not depending on which thinker you consult, but 
all agree words matter and affect the here and now. A shift in language means a shift 
in self and society. This is what scholars have termed the “strong view”46 of rhetoric 
that Isocrates’ famous laudatio eloquentiae espouses:
…there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has 
not helped us to establish…It is by this (speech) also that we confute 
the bad and extol the good…for the power to speak well is taken as the 
surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and 
lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul. With 
this faculty we both contend against others on matter which are open to 
dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are unknown…in all 
our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most 
employed by those who have the most wisdom...the kind of art which 
can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed 
and does not now exist…But I do hold that people can become better and 
worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well…the man who wishes to 
persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, on 
the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honourable 
name among his fellow citizens: for who does not know that words carry 
greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken 
by men who live under a cloud...? Therefore, the stronger a man’s desire to 
persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to be honourable
Isocrates, Antidosis 254-7, 274-8; tr. Norlin
Tzu’s opacity, see Lu (1998, p. 237). The paradoxical Beatitudes, the Messianic secret, and the idea that 
parables are meant to confound rather than illuminate (Luke 8:10) are similar methods whereby the 
New Testament encourages experiential learning of its teachings.
45  As White eloquently says about responding to semantic instability in general, “When we discover 
that we have in this world no earth or rock to stand or walk upon but only shifting sea and sky and 
wind, the mature response is not to lament the loss of fixity but to learn to sail.” (1984, p. 278).
46  Whereas the “strong defense” of rhetoric treats words as deeds that construct, rather than just 
describe, reality, the “weak defense” of rhetoric divorces form from content, substance from style. Cf. 
Lanham (1993, pp. 154-194); Leff (1998, pp. 61-88).
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Isocrates’ words represent the extreme of the “strong view” that posits that our words 
make us; without words, there is no reason, morality, society, or humanity; words are 
the sine qua non of being human. Unlike Lao Tzu, Isocrates has been less appealing 
to students as each year passes, and due in part to the fact that they espouse the 
“weak view” of rhetoric, which treats a name as a convention, a mere instrument or 
tool controlled by its user. According to this view, a name can’t change one’s moral 
character; word is distinct from deed. To what extent we encode words rather than 
being encoded by them is a matter of scholarly debate,47 but my students for the 
most part assume that we have power over language not vice versa. To them, seman-
tic instability is neutral, and not a problem at all since a word shifting its meaning 
(for example, a slang word like “cool”) does not necessarily result in a societal shift 
or social upheaval.48 Believing they have more control over their environments than 
the ancients did and more power to self-define thanks to technology, they don’t see 
rectifying names as a boon or a necessary evil. While the ancients view rectification 
as either an act of hope or fear, two sides of the same coin in Pandora’s box, these 
students don’t use the same currency. They value diversity of meaning and linguistic 
autonomy on the assumption that the sum of meanings will be greater than its parts.
As a postscript, in recent years there has been a revival of the “strong view” of 
rhetoric, albeit a less deterministic version than that posited by the ancients. From 
movies like 2016’s Arrival, which explores the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that shared 
language leads to shared perceptions of concepts like time, to politics, where the 
subject of rectification is at a fever pitch, to the world of science, where epigenetics 
is imploding the nature/nurture distinction49 and thereby the debate about language’s 
impact on thought, the debate about the extent to which words influence one’s re-
spective worldview is very much alive. Whether it be Rudolph Giuliani contending 
that Barack Obama does not really “love” his country the way other Americans 
do,50 or Hillary Clinton, having previously attacked Obama’s “empty” rhetoric, ar-
47  Consider, for example, the debate about the role of nature versus nurture in language acquisition. 
While Chomsky emphasized the role of nature in forming vocabulary via an innate “language acquisi-
tion device,” Skinner stressed the importance of experiential learning. Cf. Chomsky (1959, pp. 26-58).
48  The consensus on this is, of course, not unanimous, and students often argue that the deliberate 
changing of a name (e.g. from “freedom fighter” to “terrorist”) does impact socio-political realities. 
Deliberate shifts notwithstanding, most student papers nevertheless argue that style cannot “make 
the man” since character is determined by other factors such as spirituality, family, and personal choice 
whereby one has the autonomy to choose one’s identity.
49  For more on how the relationship between nature and nurture is more cyclic than binary, see 
Pinker (1997, pp. 3-58).
50  At a Feb 8, 2015 event for Governor Scott Walker, Giuliani contended, ““I do not believe, and I 
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guing against Trump that words do indeed matter,51 or Frank Bruni worrying that 
the current administration has cheapened rhetoric to the point of making words 
like “transparency” meaningless,52 America is in the midst of re-considering and 
re-calibrating her own attitudes towards the importance of naming. Our students 
are similarly re-evaluating their own views, and we can help them learn to navi-
gate a semantically unstable global community by sharing with them the lesson the 
ancients teach us today: Knowing one’s linguistic limits also means knowing one’s 
opportunities.
know this is a horrible thing to say, but I do not believe that the president loves America. He doesn’t 
love you. And he doesn’t love me. He wasn’t brought up the way you were brought up and I was brought 
up through love of this country… with all our flaws we’re the most exceptional country in the world. 
I’m looking for a presidential candidate who can express that, do that and carry it out.”
51  Clinton, who repeatedly attacked Obama for relying on words rather than on actions, posited that 
the 2008 campaign was about “talk versus action, rhetoric versus reality” and that the “best words in the 
world aren’t enough unless you match them with action.” (Wisconsin Primary Speech, 2/19/08). The 
sophistic divide of the mind from the tongue is a persistent theme of her campaign rhetoric: “I don’t 
want to just show up and give one of those whoop-dee-do speeches and get everybody whipped up. I 
want everyone thinking.” (Wynnewood, PA Speech, 4/19/08). In her 2016 response to Donald Trump’s 
campaign, Clinton then advocated the strong view of rhetoric: “Words matter, my friends, and if you 
are running to be president or you are president of the United States, words can have tremendous 
consequences.” (Des Moines, IA, 8/10/16).
52  For Bruni, Trump radically redefines the norms of political ‘transparency’: “It’s not merely that this 
emperor has no clothes. This emperor has no camouflage, at least none that’s consistent and effective. 
Syllable by syllable, he traffics in fantasy.” (2018, p. 3).
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